The minitar library is a pure-Ruby library that provides the ability to deal with POSIX tar(1) archive files.
This is release 0.9, adding a minor feature to Minitar.unpack and Minitar::Input#extract_entry that when
:fsync => false is provided, fsync will be skipped.
minitar (previously called Archive::Tar::Minitar) is based heavily on code originally written by Mauricio Julio Fernández Pradier for the rpa-base project.
Using minitar is easy. The simplest case is:
require 'minitar' # Packs everything that matches Find.find('tests'). # test.tar will automatically be closed by Minitar.pack. Minitar.pack('tests', File.open('test.tar', 'wb')) # Unpacks 'test.tar' to 'x', creating 'x' if necessary. Minitar.unpack('test.tar', 'x')
A gzipped tar can be written with:
require 'zlib' # test.tgz will be closed automatically. Minitar.pack('tests', Zlib::GzipWriter.new(File.open('test.tgz', 'wb')) # test.tgz will be closed automatically. Minitar.unpack(Zlib::GzipReader.new(File.open('test.tgz', 'rb')), 'x')
As the case above shows, one need not write to a file. However, it will sometimes require that one dive a little deeper into the API, as in the case of StringIO objects. Note that I'm not providing a block with Minitar::Output, as Minitar::Output#close automatically closes both the Output object and the wrapped data stream object.
begin sgz = Zlib::GzipWriter.new(StringIO.new(String.new)) tar = Output.new(sgz) Find.find('tests') do |entry| Minitar.pack_file(entry, tar) end ensure # Closes both tar and sgz. tar.close end
Minitar and Security
Minitar aims to be secure by default for the data inside of a tarfile. If there are any security issues discovered, please feel free to open an issue. Should you wish to make a more confidential report, you can find my PGP key information at Keybase. Bear with me: I do not use PGP regularly, so it may take some time to remember the command invocations required to successfully handle this.
Minitar does not perform validation of path names provided to the convenience calsses Minitar::Output and Minitar::Input, which use Kernel.open for their underlying implementations when not given an IO-like object.
Improper use of these classes with arbitrary input filenames may leave your your software to the same class of vulnerability as reported for Net::FTP (CVE-2017-17405). Of particular note, “if the localfile argument starts with the '|' pipe character, the command following the pipe character is executed.”
Additionally, the use of the `open-uri` library (which extends Kernel.open with transparent implementations of Net::HTTP, Net::HTTPS, and Net::FTP), there are other possible vulnerabilities when accepting arbitrary input, as detailed by Egor Homakov.
These security vulnerabilities may be avoided, even with the Minitar::Output and Minitar::Input convenience classes, by providing IO-like objects instead of pathname-like objects as the source or destination of these classes.
minitar Semantic Versioning
The minitar library uses a Semantic Versioning scheme with one change:
When PATCH is zero (
0), it will be omitted from version references.